The death knells of mature technologies

The oscillatory behavior in the mature phase of some technologies' diffusion-related S curves are investigated, specifically with regard to the influences that other technologies can have on the oscillations. The notion of mortality indicators is raised, that is, whether such behavior is a signal that the mature technology is under attack from an emerging technology. The case of structural panels in the wood products industry is considered as an example, and an updated forecast of the substitution of oriented strand board for plywood is made. It is concluded that factors such as macroeconomic business cycles are primarily responsible for the oscillations in plywood's S-curve, although it is argued that an emerging technology can also contribute to perturbations in a mature technology's S-curve. Two possible alternative explanations for the oscillatory behavior are also discussed, a previously proposed chaos formulation, and a mathematical model based on modified Lotka-Volterra equations. This model shows that the oscillatory behavior in mature technologies' S-curves can also result from symbiotic interaction between two technologies under certain circumstances.     

Cartelization Through Buyer Groups

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to commit credibly to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an ‘implied cartel’ depends on the retailers’ incentives to source their inputs secretly from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase provisions. We discuss the relevancy of our findings for antitrust policy.     

The effect of customer empowerment on adherence to expert advice

Customers often receive expert advice related to their health, finances, taxes or legal procedures, to name just a few. A noble stance taken by some is that experts should empower customers to make their own decisions. In this article, we distinguish informational from decisional empowerment and study whether empowerment leads customers to adhere more or less to expert advice. We empirically test our model by using a unique dataset involving 11,735 respondents in 17 countries on four continents. In the context of consumer adherence to doctors' therapy advice (patient non-adherence to doctor advice may cost about $564 billion globally to the pharmaceutical industry every year), we find that decisional empowerment lowers adherence to expert advice. The effect of informational empowerment varies predictably across cultures and is only universally beneficial when initiated by the customer. These findings have important implications for professional service providers.